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VALUATION OF INTERESTS IN TRUST: A LOUISIANA
PERSPECTIVE
The use of trusts is expanding dramatically in Louisiana as the
practicing bar realizes the estate planning opportunities which they
afford. An inherent flexibility, the availability of professional man-
agement, and innumerable tax advantages have led to the incorpora-
tion of this common law device into the Louisiana civilian system of
successions, donations and property law at a pace which often leaves
confusion, or at least uncertainty, in its wake. One such murky area
is valuation of beneficial interests in trusts for taxation purposes.
Although some basic principles are indicated in the Trust Code' and
a handful of cases dealing with the difficulties have been decided,
most valuation questions remain open and require a careful analysis
of the Trust Code in conjunction with the Internal Revenue Code and
the Louisiana Inheritance Tax Act.'
The Louisiana Trust Code permits the designation of one or more
beneficiaries as to income, principal or both.3 If there is only one
beneficiary, the valuation problem is minimal. The entire trust is
valued as his interest using the total value of all of the property in
the trust as the measure.4 However, difficulty arises when there are
several principal or income beneficiaries, especially where there is a
shifting of income interests, a possibility of an invasion of principal
or an allocation of accumulated income to the principal beneficiaries.
The least complicated of the above situations is that in which there
are separate income and principal beneficiaries for the duration of the
trust with no shifting interests whatsoever.5 Such an arrangement is
similar to the civilian concept of usufruct with income beneficiaries
approximating usufructuaries, and principal beneficaries, naked
owners.' That is, where S creates a trust with A as income beneficiary
for life and B as principal beneficiary, the effects are quite similar to
those flowing from S's having made A usufructuary and B naked
owner, the essential difference being that A, as income beneficiary,
is not burdened with the management of the property. Frequently
this occurs where the settlor wishes to leave his widow an income
interest analogous to the usufruct of the surviving spouse provided in
1. LA. R.S. 9:1721-2252 (Supp. 1964).
2. LA. R.S. 47:2401-23 (1950).
3. LA. R.S. 9:1805, 1806 (Supp. 1964).
4. LA. R.S. 9:1731, 1801, 1805 (Supp. 1964).
5. LA. R.S. 9:1805 (Supp. 1964).
6. LA. CiV. CODE art. 533.
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Civil Code article 916. So long as the children's legitime does not
comprise part of the trust res, the term of the trust may either be
fixed or can terminate upon the death of the last surviving income
beneficiary. 7 When the legitime is placed in trust,8 the trust must
terminate as to each heir's forced portion upon his death.' Further-
more, since the burden placed on the legitime cannot exceed that
which could be imposed through usufruct, 0 the trust over the legi-
time must terminate, as would the legal usufruct, upon the death or
remarriage of the surviving spouse."
Next in complexity are trusts with multiple income beneficiaries.
These interests may be either concurrent or successive;' 2 the term
may be definite, until the happening of a stated'event or for the
duration of the beneficiary's life. 3 Thus A and B may be income
beneficiaries for the entire term of the trust, either in equal shares or
some other fixed proportion, with or without the power of either to
succeed to the share of the other upon his death. Alternatively, A may
be income beneficiary for life or for a fixed term with B to succeed
him for the remainder of the life of the trust. The possible variations
are practically unlimited.
Any of the above situations can be further complicated by the
inclusion of an invasion of principal 4 or an accumulation of income
clause' in the trust instrument. Although reminiscent of the prohib-
ited substitution " in that they divest a beneficiary of a vested right
to property by transferring some of that property to another benefici-
ary, both clauses are specifically permitted by the Trust Code 7 and
should be used in the proper circumstances. The propriety of the
circumstances may often be dictated by the taxation value placed on
each of the interests. This in turn depends in each of the above
situations on the contingencies involved and the probability of their
occurrence. Even though the probability of such contigencies can be
evaluated statistically, in many instances the certainty of the calcu-
lations is not sufficient for tax purposes and the shift is treated either
7. LA. R.S. 9:1831 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 132 § 1; LA.
R.S. 9:1832-33 (Supp. 1964).
8. LA. R.S. 9:1841 (Supp. 1964).
9. LA. R.S. 9:1841, 1844 (Supp. 1964).
10. LA. R.S. 9:1844 (Supp. 1964).
11. LA. R.S. 9:1961 (Supp. 1964); 9:2068 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts
1972, No. 661 § 1.
12. LA. R.S. 9:1806, 1807 (Supp. 1964).
13. LA. R.S. 9:1961 (Supp. 1964).
14. LA. R.S. 9:2068 (Supp. 1960), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 661 § 1.
15. LA. R.S. 9:1961 (Supp. 1964).
16. LA. Cxv. CODE art. 1520.
17. LA. R.S. 9:1961 (Supp. 1964).
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as having already occurred or as having no chance of occurring. Tax
law, both federal and state, dictates what treatment is given in each
instance.
Federal Estate Taxation
The very nature of the federal estate tax prevents the problem
of valuation of the interest of each beneficiary from arising in most
cases. Since this transfer tax is computed on the basis of the entire
estate, rather than the component legacies," reference need not
usually be made to the individual beneficiary's inheritance. The
gross estate of the decedent provides the appropriate measure. It is
only when the beneficiary's share in the trust is classified as a deduc-
tion in computing the taxable (or net) estate0 or when an interest in
trust passes as a gift or part of the estate that the particular interest
must be valued. This has frequently arisen in mixed trusts2' where a
qualified public, charitable or religious institution is either the in-
come or the principal beneficiary, with a private beneficiary holding
the other interest. 22
A well settled body of law had been developed under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and its predecessors in regard to valuation of
the charitable portion of the mixed trust. For the deduction to be
available, the charity's interest had to be both ascertainable and
susceptible of valuation at the time of the creation of the trust 23 and
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001, 2051; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U.S. 339 (1929); Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61 (1924); Aldrich v. United States, 346
F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1965); Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965); Succes-
sion of Henderson, 211 La. 707, 30 So. 2d 809 (1947).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2031.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
21. LA. R.S. 9:1951 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 659 § 1.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055. Such trusts are called charitable income
trusts and charitable remainder trusts, respectively. See generally Comment, 45 TuL.
L. REV. 115 (1970).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055; Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(a), 25.2522(a)-2(a)
(1958); Humes v. United States, 276 U.S. 487 (1928). In Humes at 494, Mr. Justice
Brandeis stated the requirements in the following manner: "One may guess, or gamble
on, or even insure against, any future event. The Solicitor General tells us that Lloyds
of London will insure against having twins. But the fundamental question in the case
at bar, is not whether this contingent interest can be insured against or its value
guessed at, but what construction shall be given to a statute. Did Congress in providing
for the determination of the net estate taxable, intend that a deduction should be made
for a contingency, the actual value of which cannot be determined from any known
data? Neither taxpayer, nor revenue officer,-even if equipped with all the aid which
the actuarial art can supply,-could do more than guess at the value of this contin-
[Vol. 34
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there could be at most a negligible probability that the charity would
not get the bequest. 4 Thus a charitable remainder trust could qualify
for deduction of the charity's interest even though the trust instru-
ment contained an invasion of principal clause if the trust contained
sufficiently definite standards for invasion and if those standards met
the requirements set forth above.' 5
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 replaced these jurisprudentially
developed guidelines with the requirement that the bequest must be
in the form of an annuity trust or a unitrust in order for the charitable
donation to qualify for the deduction. 6 These trusts are ones which
annually pay the income beneficiary (annuitant) an annuity of at
least five percent of the trust corpus.27 In the annuity trust the valua-
tion of the corpus is at the commencement of the trust and the annu-
ity is fixed for the duration of the trust. 8 The unitrust share is based
on an annual valuation of corpus and, therefore, may vary from year
to year.2 Thus if S creates a trust with property valued at $100,000,
with A as income beneficiary to be paid five percent of the trust
corpus annually, i.e., $5,000 a year, the trust is an annuity trust. If
the valuation of the corpus is to be made annually and A is to receive
five percent of that annual valuation, it is a unitrust. In the first type
A's annual income from the trust is permanently fixed at its creation,
whereas in the second it may vary."0
gency. It is clear that Congress did not intend that a deduction should be made for a
contingent gift of that character."
24. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595 (1949);
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943); Ithaca Trust Co. v.
United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). In Ithaca Trust Co. at 154, Mr. Justice Holmes
lookd for: (1) A "standard was fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite
terms of money." (2) Lack of discretion in the private beneficiary. (3) "No uncertainty
appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs." For an
excellent survey of the jurisprudence on this point see Kline v. United States, 202 F.
Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962).
25. Id.
26. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(f)(2), 2055(e)(2), 2522(i)(2); Comment, 45
TUL. L. REV. 115 (1970).
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(1), (2).
28. Id. § 664(d)(1).
29. Id. § 664(d)(2).
30. Until the Trust Code was amended in 1972 the practitioner was faced with the
possibility that annuity trusts and unitrusts could not validly be created in Louisiana.
Because of this danger, the legislature, on the recommendation of the Louisiana Law
Institute, amended Trust Code Articles 1951, 1952 and 2068 to specifically authorize
the use of such trusts. (La. Acts 1972, Nos. 659-61). The standards provided in the
Internal Revenue Code are by reference adopted as controlling. LA. R.S. 9:1951 (Supp.
1964), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 659 § 1; LA. R.S. 9:1952 (Supp. 1964), as
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Valuation of annuity and unitrusts is relatively straightforward.
The value of the annual income under the annuity trust is computed
using the fair market value of the trust corpus and the percentage
return (at least five percent) specified in the trust instrument.:" The
term must be ascertained, whether it is fixed or for the annuitant's
life. In this latter case mortality tables must be used to compute the
annuitant's life expectancy, which is used as the term of the trust.
Value is then calculated as for any annuity. In the case of the unitrust
similar computations are made, taking into account probable fluc-
tuations in the value of the property."2
Louisiana Inheritance Taxation
In contrast to the federal estate tdx which is levied upon the
transfer of the entire estate, the Louisiana inheritance tax is on the
privilege of receipt of each legacy or inheritance by the legatees.3 3 As
a result, the measure of the tax is the size of the individual legacy;
the portion of the legacy exempt from taxation and the applicable tax
rates are dependent upon the relation of the legatee to the testator. 34
Therefore the valuation problem will arise every time a testamentary
trust is created and whenever a beneficial interest in trust passes in
the estate of a decedent. In cases where there is only one beneficiary,
valuation is simple: the value of the beneficiary's share equals the
value of the trust corpus. Similarly, where the income and principal
beneficiaries are the same persons, holding both income and principal
interests in the same proportion, the value of each one's share equals
the fractional value of his interest in the trust. 35 Complications arise
only when there are separate income and principal beneficiaries.
In the conventional trust without an invasion of principal clause
amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 660 § 1; LA. R.S. 9:2068 (Supp. 1964), as amended
by La. Acts 1972, No. 661 § 1. Because of this the annuity trusts and unitrusts permit-
ted under Louisiana law will always coincide with those required for federal tax pur-
poses. See generally Oppenheim, The 1972 Amendments to the Trust Code of 1964, 47
TUL. L. REV. 315 (1973).
31. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 664(d)(1)(2); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.664-2 to -3 (1972).
32. The above outline of the procedures is, of necessity, greatly simplified. Treas-
ury Regulations 1.664-1 through 1.664-4 (1972) provide detailed guidance in this com-
plex process.
33. Succession of Henderson, 211 La. 707, 30 So. 2d 809 (1947); LA. R.S. 47:2401
(1950).
34. LA. R.S. 47:2402 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 543 § 1; 47:2403
(Supp. 1958), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 543 § 1.




or any provision for accumulation of income, the financial position
of the parties is very similar to that involved in usufruct." Since the
legislature has provided a method for valuation of a usufruct or an
annuity,37 it would seem that the proper method of valuation of the
analogous trust interest is to consider the interest of the income bene-
ficiary to be similar to a usufruct over the trust res and to use the
tables provided in R.S. 47:2405 to calculate its worth. 3 This actuarial
value is then subtracted from the value of the trust property to deter-
mine the value of the principal beneficiary's interest.33 This approach
has the further benefit that it can be readily adapted for use in more
complicated situations, as was done in Succession of Kaufman.0 In
that case the testatrix had left her property in trust with her husband
and daughter as concurrent income beneficiaries and her grandchil-
dren as principal beneficiaries. The trust instrument further provided
that the daughter was to succeed to the husband's income interest
upon his death and that the grandchildren were to succeed her as
income beneficiaries. The trustee was authorized to invade principal
for the care of the husband during his life and thereafter for the care
of the daughter. In approaching the valuation problems, the court
began by holding that the income interest should be treated as if it
were a usufruct over the trust corpus. The income interest relating
to the property which would have been subject to the usufruct of the
surviving spouse was considered to be analogous to a testamentarily
confirmed usufruct and thus was held to be exempt from inheritance
taxation." The first time the court of appeal heard the case it held
that the invasion of principal clause would cause the entire trust
corpus (except for the legitime which could not be invaded under the
provisions of the Trust Code) to be taxable to the income beneficiary,
the settlor's husband.2 The court first calculated the husband's tax
liability and the value of the property (both taxable and exempt)
which was considered for tax purposes as passing to him. The court
36. Succession of Bellinger, 229 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
37. LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950).
38. Succession of Bellinger, 229 So. 2d 749, 751 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969): "We
therefore feel, that even though the inheritance tax sections of our law do not speak in
terms of an income interest or income benefit, but rather in terms of a usufruct, we
feel that the same tax rules should be applicable here."
39. LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950).
40. 274 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). The case had previously been heard
by the court, 229 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), writs refused, 255 La. 279, 230
So. 2d 587 (1970), at the same time as Succession of Bellinger, 229 So. 2d 749 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1969).
41. 274 So. 2d 471, 473.
42. 229 So. 2d 752.
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next determined the tax due by the daughter of the settlor. In so
doing the court held that the possibility of an invasion of principal
for her benefit was so remote as to have no tax consequences for her.43
The reasoning was that the imposition of the tax is based upon the
situation as it existed at the time of the death of the testatrix, and
therefore contingent occurrences which might or might not occur in
the future could not be considered. The same approach caused the
court to hold that successive contingent income interests could not
be taxed to those potential future beneficiaries since the interests did
not come into being at the time of the testatrix's death." Future
interests which do not vest "seizin in fact" in the recipient are not
subject to the Louisiana inheritance tax.45
After having valued the interests of the husband and daughter,
the court proceeded to value the rights of the principal beneficiaries,
the grandchildren. Although it first carefully pointed out that these
interests should be valued at their actual cash value, the court con-
cluded that the only equitable way it could compute this was by
deducting the value previously attributed to the husband and the
daughter from the total value of the trust corpus to reach the value
of the remainder." In this manner the court assured that the entire
estate would be valued for taxation, but that none of the property
would be counted more than once. There certainly is a logical appeal
to any approach which concludes that the sum of the parts equals the
whole.
Should other courts refuse to follow the First Circuit "seizin in
fact" analysis, then where successive income interests have been cre-
ated, whether for fixed terms or the life of each beneficiary, the value
of each may be calculated using the tables in R.S. 47:2405. If A is the
first income beneficiary for life, B to succeed him for the duration of
his life, A's life expectancy is obtained from the mortality table and
from this the value of his interest is computed. Using B's age as of
the projected date of death of A, the same calculations are performed
for the second income interest. The value is totaled and subtracted
from the fair market value of the trust res to determine the value of
the principal interest. If the term of either or both income interest
were fixed rather than for life, the stipulated term is used in the
computation, rather than the actuarially determined life expectancy.
43. 274 So. 2d 471, 476.
44. Id.
45. 274 So. 2d 471, 476, citing Succession of Martin, 234 La. 566, 100 So. 2d 509
(1958).
46. 274 So. 2d 471, 477.
[Vol. 34
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In each case, a reasonable, though arbitrary, rate of return on the
trust principal is assumed in order to figure the value of the income
interest. 7
If the term of the interest is dependent upon the happening of
an event, the occurrence or timing of which is insusceptible of mathe-
matical computation or forecast, complex valuation problems occur.
With an incalculable term, the income interest cannot be fixed with
any precision. Frequently this problem arises in Louisiana when the
legitime is placed in a trust which serves the function of the legal
usufruct of the surviving spouse.48 The Trust Code provides that the
term of the trust cannot exceed the life of the forced heir nor can the
burden on the legitime be for a greater time than would be possible
using usufruct."9 Since the legal usufruct of the surviving spouse must
terminate upon the death or remarriage of the spouse,"' it would seem
that the trust over the legitimate would of necessity terminate upon
the happening of the first of these events to occur. Although the
actuarially expected dates of death of both the surviving spouse and
the forced heir can be computed, there is not sufficient certainty as
to the occurrence of the last contingency, remarriage, to allow for
computation of its anticipated date. Yet without this, the term can-
not be forecast and the value cannot be fixed. It is instructive to note
that the Louisiana courts have extracted themselves from this quan-
dry in valuing the usufruct of the surviving spouse by merely ignoring
the unmeasurable contingency and calculating the value with regard
only to the expected date of death of the usufructuary.' If this ap-
proach is followed in the case of the legitime in trust, value can be
calculated by using the shorter of the life expectancies (1) of the
surviving spouse (or other income beneficiary in similar incalculable
situations) or (2) of the forced heir (or principal beneficiary) as the
term of the trust.
A much different result is reached, however, in cases of private
trusts containing invasion of principal clauses.52 Although it has been
47. LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950) fixes the rate currently at six percent.
48. LA. Civ. CODE art. 916.
49. LA. R.S. 9:1841, 1844 (Supp. 1964).
50. LA. CIv. CODE art. 916. In Succession of Chauvin, 260 La. 828, 257 So. 2d 422
(1972) the supreme court held that a testamentarily confirmed usufruct of the surviv-
ing spouse would terminate upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse as is
provided in Civil Code article 916.
51. Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911); In re Stelly's Estate, 185
So. 637 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939); LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950); Op. LA. Arr'y GEN. 1183
(1934-36).
52. Succession of Kaufman, 274 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Succession
19731
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
strenuously argued that criteria similar to that developed by the
federal courts in charitable remainder cases should be adopted in
Louisiana, such a result has not been reached. 3 Rather the courts
have treated the entire trust as being inherited by the income benefi-
ciary, and thus taxable to him. There is strong indication in
Succession of Kaufman,5" however, that the courts may be reevaluat-
ing this position.
One final problem that should be dealt with is the valuation of
annuity trusts and unitrusts for the Louisiana inheritance tax. The
most logical approach would be to adopt the federal tax value, rea-
soning that these devices are creatures of the federal tax law which
have been incorporated into the Louisiana Trust Code to allow the
Louisiana resident the benefit of the available federal tax advan-
tages. Since the Trust Code looks to the Internal Revenue Code for
definitions and rules regarding the use of unitrusts and annuity
trusts,55 shouldn't Louisiana inheritance tax law likewise look to fed-
eral procedures of valuation? If so, problems are minimal; the proce-
dure previously outlined in conjunction with federal taxation would
be used.
If, on the other hand, the courts look to traditional state
valuation concepts, we might reach different results with regard to
unitrusts. The annuity trust would be valued as is provided in the
explicit statutory provisions dealing with valuation of annuities and
property subject thereto.5" This is the same procedure as is used for
federal taxation. Using the tables provided we calculate the life ex-
pectancy of the beneficiary 57 and find the present value of the right
of Kaufman, 229 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Succession of Bellinger, 229 So.
2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Succession of Lindsey, 179 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1965).
53. Id.
54. 274 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
55. LA. R.S. 9:1951 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 659 § 1;
9:1952 (Supp. 1972); LA. R.S. 2068 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No.
133 § 1; 1972, No. 661 § 1.
56. LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950). That an annuity such as the one from an annuity trust
is contemplated in the above statute see Succession of Cotton, 172 La. 819, 135 So.
368 (1931). It must be admitted that Louisiana courts could extend the reasoning of
the Kaufman, Bellinger and Lindsey cases and hold that, since principal could be
depleted in the annuity trust, the entire trust must be treated as a legacy to the
annuitant for inheritance taxation purposes. But in order to so hold, the courts would
have to ignore the clearly applicable statutory provision for annuity valuation. LA. R.S.
47:2405 (1950).




to receive the principal at the end of that time, giving us the value
of the principal beneficiary's interest. The value of the income benefi-
ciary's interest is calculated by discounting the annuity to be received
over his life expectancy to its present value 8 and adding those present
values together to reach a total figure.5 9 Valuation of the unitrust is
not provided for in the inheritance tax statutes. However, an an-
swer to our dilemma may be found by looking to the principles em-
bodied in the Louisiana jurisprudence dealing with trust taxation.
Since principal can possibly be exhausted and the value of the uni-
trust share varies each year with fluctuations in principal, it can be
expected that the rationale of earlier cases might be followed to hold
that the entire corpus of the trust must be taxed as a legacy to the
income beneficiary."' The sounder approach would certainly value the
unitrust, and likewise the annuity trust, in the same manner as is
done for federal tax purposes, thereby approximating, as closely as
possible, the actual value of the interest involved.
Gregory B. Adams*
58. The "Present Value" table of LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950) is used, computing the
present value of the annuity for each year in the annuitant's life expectancy.
59. LA. R.S. 47:2405 (1950).
60. However, this approach might not be followed, since the court in Succession
of Kaufman, 274 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) indicated a questioning of the
reasoning behind it. If that were the case, the Louisiana courts certainly should look
to the method of Treas. Reg. § 1.664-4 (1972).
* Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
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